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A CRITIQUE OF ILLEGITIMATE
NONINTERPRETIVISM
Gary C. Leedes*
1.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSTITUTION'S
INDETERMINATE PROVISIONS

Although the Constitution is widely accepted as this nation's basic
source of valid law, its indeterminacy has always been a problem for its
interpreters. Some provisions appear to be empty vessels. The inscrutable ninth amendment immediately comes to mind, 1 and there are
others. The equal protection clause' has perhaps an uncontested core
meaning, but its evocative peripheral meaning lacks discernible limits.
The due process clauses have stimulated heated controversy, and some
of the Supreme Court's best and worst opinions have involved substan-

tive due process doctrine.
Each indeterminate constitutional provision requires intermediate
premises to connect text with events, past, present, and anticipated." As
intermediate premises are introduced, inevitably the meaning of the
first principles changes, which creates new areas of uncertainty. The
development of new mediating abstractions is a creative enterprise
since judges alter the meanings of words in accordance with their own
approaches or theories. 5
Interpreters of the Constitution disagree about the function of the
Constitution; they also disagree about the methods of interpretation.
Interesting questions concerning the proper methods of interpretation
are provoking many responses, but no widely accepted theory. The diffi* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, B.S.E., University of Pennsylvania (1960);
LL.B., Temple University (1962); LL.M., Harvard University (1973). A version of this article
will appear in a forthcoming book by Professor Leedes entitled The Meaning of the Constitution.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1980). See also C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981).
2. For example, the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § i. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 22-30 (1980).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
4. Interpretation is an intellectual activity which accompanies the process of law application
in its progression from a broad to a narrower norm. During this process, the more general norm
becomes more concrete in its meaning. It acquires, in other words, a more particular meaning. See.

H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 348 (1967).

5. Were it not for the self-disciplined judge's theory of law his discretion would be extremely broad, because the constitutional provision typically is a norm that has the character of a
broad frame that needs filling. Each particular application partially fills in the frame. Id. at 349.
In order to channel discretion, there must be some method or criterion that stipulates that one
possibility within the frame is preferable to another. Id. at 352.
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culties have not changed the fact that the Constitution is still the
center of gravity for the system of lawmaking. 6 It is, however, becoming less unusual for critical scholars to claim that the Constitution is no
longer the basic norm that specifies the criteria of legal validity. Theories, however, are far more transitory than the Constitution they
describe.
Some theories of interpretation, for example, "strict intentionalism
and "literalism," 8 are no longer credible. Discernment of the
framers' actual intent is difficult since the light that could reveal the
authentic original meaning of the Constitution is dimmed by the mist
of time. When we try to reconstruct the meaning the framers attributed to the Constitution and its various parts, the available materials
permit us to take only "'samples' and 'soundings'." 9 The voices of
those who adopted the Constitution are virtually inaudible owing to the
"7

huge "unrecorded hum of implication." 10
The Supreme Court, of course, has successfully asserted its power
to interpret the Constitution. Official action is said to be invalid when it
is repugnant to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution in "cases
or controversies.""1 Owing to the doctrine of judicial supremacy,"2 jurists and scholars take turns attacking and defending the legitimacy of

6. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961) Professor Hart writes,
there still remains a distinction between a constitution which, after setting up a system of
courts, provides that the law shall be whatever the supreme court thinks fit, and the actual
constitution of the United States .

. .

. 'The constitution

. . .

is whatever the judges say it

is', if interpreted as denying this distinction, is false. At any given moment judges, even
those of a supreme court, are parts of a system the rules of which are determinate enough
at the centre to supply standards of correct judicial decision. These are regarded by the
courts as something which they are not, free to disregard in the exercise of the authority to
make those decisions which cannot be challenged within the system.
Id. at 141-42.
7. Professor Brest makes the helpful distinction between literalism or strict textualism and
strict intentionalism. "Strict intentionalism requires the interpreter to determine how the adopters
would have applied a provision to a given situation, and to apply it accordingly. The enterprise
rests on the questionable assumption that the adopters of constitutional provisions intended them
to be applied in this manner." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding. 60

B.U.L. REV. 204, 222 (1980).
8. "A thorough-going literalist understands a text to encompass all those and only those
instances that come within its words read without regard to its social or perhaps even its linguistic
context." Id.
9.

Hamilton, Introduction in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED xiii (C. Read ed. 1938).
M. KAMMEN, THE PEOPLE OF PARADOX 1 (1973).
II.
U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2.

10.

12. For a discussion of how the doctrine of judicial sovereignty developed during the tenure
of Chief Justice John Marshall, see R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 53-80

(1960). The Court has added further gloss by stating that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has . . . been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, IS (1958).
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constitutional policymaking by the judiciary.18 Some of the participants
in the debate have developed theories of constitutional law," but their
theories generate serious differences of opinion. 1 5 Among the theorists,
there are interpretivists,1 6 noninterpretivists," and other rival groups
which have split into sects with diverse views. Some believe that judges
should take the lead in the movement for moral growth,18 others are
apostles of judicial restraint;1 ' still others advocate the process-oriented
approach, 0 and finally, there are commentators who are content to let
the Court do its own thing because it always has and always will." As
a result, there are many fragments of theory; the Court itself is eclectic
when it adopts ideas. Because the Court remains somewhat unpredictable, there is a basis to conclude that the current crop of theories is not
descriptively accurate. Despite endless academic brainstorming, there is
still a need for, but an absence of, a reliable descriptive theory of constitutional law.
Different judges have different theories,' and, therefore, demands
for consistency and coherence, if pressed too far, are "forms of utopian
argument."28 It is not utopian, however, to expect continuity rather
than disconnected points of law. Alexander Bickel wrote, "[c]ontinuity
is a chief concern of the Court, as it is the main reason for the Court's
place in the hearts of its countrymen."" If a theory that stressed continuity could be developed, a judicial decision consistent with the theory would be perceived as theoretically sound instead of result oriented.
Two pitfalls have trapped certain theorists: incurable romantic
speculation and pedantry. Political scientists, with good reason, mistrust "the incurable romanticism of the speculative theorist who requires no evidence beyond his own intuitions, and

. . .

the compulsive

earnestness of the quantitative technician who accepts nothing that

13.

See, e.g.. Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259

(1981).
14. See J. ELY, supra note 2. See also P. BOnBrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
15. See, e.g., Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
16. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding
Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution. 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 7, at 204.
18. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
19. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
20. See J. ELY, supra note 2.
21. See generally A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY (1978).
22. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 166, 283-90, 362 (1977).
23. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court. 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 832 (1982).
24. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 32 (1962).
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cannot be expressed in numbers and everything that can." 2 The fussy
interpretivists who would keep the Constitution in the straitjacket of
the framers' specific intentions stumble into both pitfalls. For numbers,
they substitute snippets from the historical record, and for inferences,
they lean heavily upon their own dogmatic preconceptions. Fortunately,
nitpicking interpretivism is on the decline. Some of our best interpretivists26 defend their approach by citing the underlying principles of a
representative democracy.2 7 All interpretivists, however, are under attack because their general approach is not descriptive of the Supreme
Court's actual work habits, and because an older generation's adherence to traditional sources of constitutional law is perceived to be inimical to moral progress' 8 or some other fashionable objective.2 9 But if the
Constitution's text, structure and history are no longer the only foundations for a theory of constitutional interpretation, then what else is
acceptable?
One method frequently used by theorists to overcome the indeterminate provisions of the Constitution is to single out one supreme principle of political morality as the premise from which all elaboration
follows. For example, it is tempting to identify the concept "equal concern and respect" 8 0 (or "the duty of representation that lies at the core
of our- system")31 as the fundamental first principle that supports the
entire Constitution. The case, however, has not yet been proven that
the Constitution rests solely upon one or two identifiable underpinnings.
This building block method frequently ignores case law developments.
A theory is required to explain the cases that elaborate authoritatively
upon the Constitution's indeterminate provisions. There is reason to believe that the framers' left to posterity the development of a theory that
explains many provisions in the Constitution. 3 '

25.

W. BUCHANAN, UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL VARIABLES 316 (1969).

26. Perry focuses on the first string trio of Raoul Berger, Judge Robert Bork and Justice
William Rehnquist. See M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 61-69, 103-07.
27. See J. ELY, supra note 2.
28. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 103-07, 111-19.
29. Perry writes, "[noninterpretivism] can explain and justify a policymaking institution
whose morality is 'open,' not 'closed'-an institution that resolves moral problems not simply by
looking backward to the sediment of old moralities, but ahead to emergent principles in terms of
which fragments of a new moral order can be forged." Id. at 11l (footnote omitted). He adds that
"constitutional theory must not be propounded in a historical vacuum; it must be sensitive to
context-the context of our own time." Id. at 119. In an even stronger statement, Perry writes, "I
prefer to let the framers sleep. Just as the framers, in their day, judged by their lights, so must
we, in our day, judge by ours." Id. at 75.
30. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 180.
31. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 135.
32. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Dean Ely's notion of "ultimate interpretivism ' '3 3 has the potential
to develop into a descriptive and explanatory theory. The paradigm of
ultimate interpretivism suggests that some values are submerged in the
model of government (which is outlined by the Constitution). Some of
these deep values are presuppositions of the Constitution; others are
implicit in its indeterminate provisions. These inchoate values suggest
that the Constitution can be viewed as a "disciplinary matrix"'-" 'disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of
the practitioners of a particular discipline; 'matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further
35
specification.1
The paradigm of ultimate interpretivism requires a clarification of
the concept of "framers' intent." Their first principles, indeed, our conception of a first principle, might have to be reexamined. Each' first
principle should be verified as authentic, but as Kuhn writes,
"[v]erification is like natural selection, it picks out the most viable
among the actual alternatives in a particular historical situation." 36
The most viable alternatives are those that appear to have a historical
pedigree, or those with power to connect the present with the past in
accordance with the objectives of a theory of ultimate interpretivism
that stresses continuity. The paradigm of ultimate interpretivism requires a theory that is attentive to the available historical materials.
References to history, of course, can lead to unwarranted assumptions.
Trustworthy inductive generalizations about the framers' intent might
be unavailable, but in the social sciences, which deal with probabilities,
there is not merely one method of analyzing the data. Descriptive legal
theories, therefore, should be offered tentatively. There is not necessarily only one right answer to a question of constitutional law. "7
II.

THE BROAD CONTINUUM BETWEEN INTERPRETIVIST AND

NONINTERPRETIVIST EXTREMES

The debate between interpretivists and noninterpretivists is a sequel to the nineteenth century jurisprudential debate about positive
law. According to one side of the older debate, law evolves spontaneously within a society, and the search for the origins of law is the

33.

See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 88.

34.

T.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

35.
36.
37.

182 (2d ed. 1970).

Id.
Id. at 146.
The statement in the text is controversial. See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW,
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds.
1977).
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search for custom." Law in other words has its own vitality, and the
language of law is a medium that indicates the customary norms of
behavior that are enforced by the State. Under John Austin's much
different view, law is not merely the recognition of custom; the image
invoked is that of a powerful authority that stands above the society
and issues commands.39 Similarly, the contemporary interpretivists supposedly look to the electorally accountable officials who make law, unless a more powerful and authoritative generator of norms, the Constitution, specifically prohibits the official action. Noninterpretivists, on
the other hand, supposedly look to customs, tradition, consensus and
the developing insights of morality. These sources of law generate reasonable expectations, and case rulings which interpret the Constitution.
References to interpretivism and noninterpretivism are manifestations of stereotypical thinking, and the dichotomy is somewhat misleading. Now and in bygone eras, both "ideal types" describe only part of
the truth. Law is both transcendent and immanent, and the cases disclose that judge-made constitutional law is partially subjective and partially objective - that is, it is partially the embodiment into law of
reasonable expectations and partially the positive law that is more or
less spelled out in the Constitution's specific provisions.
Thinkers, usually classified as interpretivists, are motivated by
objectives that relate to concerns about representative democracy, the
value of continuity in the law, the value of a safe and sound approach
that respects tradition, the advantages of a legal system that consists of
a coherent body of norms that are derived from the basic positive law
norm, the potential abuses of judicial review, the importance of having
the legislature transform popular will into law, the disanalogies between law and morality and between legal reasoning and moral reasoning, the fears that courts will rush blindly ahead and impose moral
judgments without regard for the currently received community morality and a mistrust of natural law because of fears that it will lead to a
radical social transformation. Of course, since these concerns and
objectives are not obvious directives of the text,'0 or from the framers'
intent, there are no pure interpretivists. Moreover, many so-called
noninterpretivists share these same concerns.
The "interpretivist" label also supposedly depicts a positive law
orientation" ' that allows interpreters of the Constitution little leeway in
the expansion and contraction of principles with constitutional dimen-

38.
39.
40.
41.

C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 1-8 (7th ed. 1964).
Id.
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
J. ELY, supra note 2, at i n.*.
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sions. Because of the objectives, principles and policies which motivate
interpretivists, their penchant for strict construction of the Constitution
mainly applies to the judicial branch. Contemporary interpretivists permit the electorally accountable officials substantial leeway. The Congress can interpret the tenth amendment"' and the necessary and
proper clause " virtually as it pleases. The framers' intent does not restrict an interpreter's discretion as much as when Congress is doing the
interpreting although the point can be overstated - Justice Rehnquist's resurrection of the tenth amendment comes to mind." But in
the area of individual rights, the so-called interpretivists, by and large,
presume that the legislature has virtually unfettered discretion unless
there is a specific prohibition placed upon their powers by the
Constitution.
Few (so-called) noninterpretivists suggest that judges have the
power to write on a clean slate. The clean slate notion of course does
not describe the development of the Supreme Court's case law, even
though some poorly written opinions can be cited to create that illusion." Most specialists in legal theory realize that the Constitution is
respected as the basic norm by the Supreme Court, and that the
Court's respect for the Document is a virtue that earns it the respect of
those who adhere to the doctrine of constitutionalism. This is not to say
that the Court steadfastly rejects the ideals of natural law. Indeed, the
positive law versus natural law debate is somewhat rhetorical in the
United States. The concession by all, except a minute minority, that
courts have the power of judicial review enables judges to incorporate
into the Constitution those natural law principles that are logically
compatible with the Constitution's meaning. In any event, all judgemade law is technically positive law since the courts are duly established as a legal organ with power to command, sanction, authorize,
and permit human behavior.
The entire debate between the interpretivists and the noninterpretivists is a debate about abstractions. The differences of opinion between the polarities run along a continuum. Nearly everyone, except
those who prefer banging on the table as opposed to describing the
cases, respects the value of precedent, standard modes of legal reasoning and plausible interpretations of language. Few question the value of
constitutionalism, which imposes some limits on all branches of government, federal, state, and local. Perhaps noninterpretivists are more.
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
44. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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likely to want to improve or change the system; they emphasize human
rights and look for the right answers that solve the problems of social
injustice. If we must generalize, interpretivists tend to be more conservative when judge-made law is discussed; they are more likely to
want to preserve the system as they look for authentic principles and
sources of positive law.
The danger is that the foregoing generalizations tend to degenerate into a conceptualism which ignores the real line drawing problem;
namely, the line that should be drawn between permissible discretion
and the kind of discretion that is prohibited by the doctrines of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The problem with judge-made law is
the fear (and sometimes the reality) of unfettered discretion, which enables courts to impose unacceptable values on people. The solution is to
confine the judges' discretion, no easy trick, but he who beats on the
table and exhorts judges to follow the strict canons of interpretivism,
triggers a response on the part of most of us which is, in the words of
the grave digger, "Cudgel thy brains no more about it, for your dull ass
will not mend his pace with beating." In short, theorists who build systems that do not describe the courts' pragmatic trial and error approaches are prisoners of their own conceptualism.
III.

ULTIMATE INTERPRETIVISM

The distance between interpretivism and noninterpretivism is
bridged by the Supreme Court since it sometimes uses one method and
sometimes the other. There is, however, a need to build a better bridge,
for as Justice Rehnquist has written, "[c]onstitutional building blocks
have been piled on top of one another so that the connection between
the original provision in the Constitution and the [Court's] application
in a particular case is all but incomprehensible." 6 This "tottering
tower" 47 image suggests that the time has come to search for a constitutional theory with several underpinnings, so that when one line of
cases is rejected, the integrity of the entire structure of constitutionalism is not undermined.
The theory that builds from the paradigm of ultimate interpretivism explains the systemic unity of legal norms that have both a steadying and a dynamic quality. Although law, at times, is "the outcome of
interactions among a chaotic set of contingent forces,"4' the object of a
conventional theory of ultimate interpretivism is to classify a multitude
46.

Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 989 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of

cert.).
47. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 3 (1981).
48. Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (1982).
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of data and to arrange it so that the data can be comprehended as a
cosmos instead of chaos. The steadying factors described by a conventional theory of ultimate interpretivism are also prescriptive, because
the theory advocates adherence to patterns of behavior that gives the
judge-made law regularity and predictability.
Conventional theory identifies rules for constitutional adjudication
that permit the expansion and contraction of principles at a rate, and
on a scale, which ensures some stability in the law. The principles of
the law are the primary sources for the justifications of case rulings. As
MacCormick writes,
when we ask what gives a principle legal quality we must give the answer in terms of its actual or potential explanatory"and justificatory
function in relation to law as already established, that is, in relation to
established rules of law as identified by reference to criteria ,of
recognition.4
A conventional theory of ultimate interpretivism explains how the
Constitution remains the same as it changes, presupposing that the
Constitution itself, and not the theory which explains it, 50 is the basic
norm.
,IV.

THE LEGAL CODE, AND THE FRAMERS' INTENT JUSTIFICATION

Ultimate interpretivism is a paradigm that can support a descriptive theory that explains what the courts are doing, and the framers'
intent is accepted only with reluctance by many lawyers and judges.
Judge Neely, for example, writes:
Lawyers . . .who take seriously recent U.S. Supreme Court historical
scholarship as applied to the Constitution also probably believe in the
Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny. The truth of the matter is that
judges do not say these things with a straight face; they are talking in
code which most of the bar understands."

What is the Code that most of the bar understands, and how devious a
code is it?
The legal profession understands that the framers' intent is a powerful justification for a case ruling. No lawyer who can show that the
49. N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL

REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY

238 (1978).

50. If I understand Ronald Dworkin correctly we differ on this point to the extent that he
conveys the impression that the theory, which explains the Constitution, is the basic norm, and not
the other way around. See Dworkin, supra note 40. However, the text is not inconsistent with the
following statement by Dworkin: "[S]cholars who say they simply start from the premise that the
Constitution is law underestimate the complexity of their own theories." Id. at 475 (footnote
omitted).
51. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 18 (1981).
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original understanding of a constitutional provision is consistent with
his client's cause will fail to call that fact to the court's attention. The
framers' intent may be a reification,52 but as Dean Sandalow notes, it is
comforting to the public, and "it seems to support the institutional arrangements we have established for giving contemporary meaning to
the Constitution. . . .
Just as no lawyer will ignore the framers' intent in a hard case, no judge will hesitate to cite the original understanding if it supports his case ruling. Even if the framers' intent is
nothing more than an ostensibly justifying reason for a decision," there
are strong pressures on judges to give reasons for their decisions which
appear to be authoritative." Attributing responsibility for the decision
to the "wise men we call 'the framers'" gives comfort to the public and
a sense of repose to the profession."
Judges are expected to be the impartial determiners of disputes
that are brought to court, and the law reviews and newspaper editors
will righteously critize the judge who does not appear impartial. When
Smith sues Jones, a decision in favor of Smith, of course, is not, strictly
speaking, impartial because there is a winner and a loser. The applicable law obviously favors some interests and groups over others, but if
the law can be traced back to principles compatible with the framers'
intent, there is an objective (impersonal) justification for the judge's
decision. Of course, it would be absurd to contend that the framers
wanted Smith to win and Jones to lose; every decision at the most concrete level of particularity goes beyond the framers' intent.
Judge Neely writes, "[f]ocusing on the purported intention of the
geniuses in 1789 is like looking at one frame in the middle of a motion
picture film."15 7 The entire moving picture would capture the whole
course of relevant history, including the antecedents of the contested
constitutional provision and its line of growth. If I were to name the
motion picture, I would call it ultimate interpretivism in an effort to
distinguish it from the X-rated film "illegitimate noninterpretivism,"
and the cartoon known as "literal interpretivism." But I do not want to
wander from my purpose, which is to decipher the code used by lawyers and judges when they interpret the Constitution.
The lawyer for Smith who cites The Federalist Essays or selected
"3

52. Dworkin writes, "there is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be
discovered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be invented." Dworkin,
supra note 40, at 477. This is an overstated position, although I cannot deny that a faulty reconstruction of the framers' intent is usually perceived correctly as an invention.
53. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1981).

54. N.
55.
56.
57.

MACCORMICK,

supra note 49, at 16.

Id. at 17.
Sandalow, supra note 53.
R. NEELY, supra note 51, at 18.
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snippets from Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 is
more than likely earning a fee. He might want to win the case in order
to justify the amount, but he will not bring this fact to the court's attention. The judge who decides the case for Smith does so perhaps because he has a political philosophy, which happens to be quite different
from the philosophy of James Madison, yet in his opinion, there are
numerous references to Madison. Why does the judge not make his
opinion more candid and cite his own philosophy, which is based on the
complete works of Mark Twain? Because a decision based on the framers' intent is accepted within the system as a better reason for the judgment of the court. What actually prompts a judge to decide for Smith
"isquite a different matter from the question whether there are...
good justifying reasons"" that connect his decision to the Constitution.
The code is the medium for communicating the ostensibly justifying
reasons; we call it the legal code. It is the law. What the judge had for
breakfast may prompt him to rule in favor of Smith, but his breakfast
is an extralegal irrelevancy. 5 '
There is a tendency to leap to the conclusion that the process that
I have just described is hypocritical, but it is not a dereliction of duty if
the judge has conscientiously developed certain habits which satisfy the
public's expectations of impartiality. In my Smith versus Jones example, there was obviously some hidden motivation on the part of the
judge, as well as the lawyer, but the hidden motivation reveals that
"Itihose who work within [the] system persuade precisely by convincing the relevant audience that there are reasons of overriding weight
why X ought to be done. .
Justice Black, for example, would not
be regarded by the legal profession as a hypocrite if his private papers
were published revealing that all his decisions were consistent with his
unstated prejudices or with some political philosophy that was his own
peculiar synthesis of Thucydides, Madison, and Tom Watson. Justice
Black might cite Madison, but Tom Watson-no way. Black was perceived as an interpretivist, but he was not naive in attributing his value
choices to the Founding Fathers. If not completely candid, his opinions
".."60

58. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 49, at 16.
59. Judge Frank wrote:
But talks with candid judges have begun to disclose that, whatever is said in opinions, the
judge often arrives at his decision before he tries to explain it. With little or no preliminary
attention to legal rules or a definite statement of facts, he often makes up his mind that
Jones should win the lawsuit not Smith ...
Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653 (1932).
The law, however, was not made when the judge made up his mind because of his breakfast
or other reasons that are not mentioned in the opinion that justifies his decision. Certain reasons
are not mentionable because technically they are not legally relevant. They are not law.
60. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 49, at 15.
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reveal what is expected of the Court. "The way an institution advertises tells you what it thinks its customers demand." 6 1
V.

SALVAGING REMNANTS OF THE FRAMERS' INTENT JUSTIFICATION

Never has conventional legal theory been under attack from so
many quarters."" A new generation of academicians is not satisfied with
codes and fictions that disguise existing unjust power relationships.
Clearly, the preceding self-congratulatory and complacent description
of the usefulness of the framers' intent code as a justification for these
relationships will no longer satisfy all critical legal scholars. It is tempting to abandon the framers' intent personification and speak, as
Learned Hand did, of "proliferation of purpose."" But even that will
no longer suffice, because there are critical scholars who want to know
the real contemporary meaning of the proliferation of purpose. Thus,
Justice Peckham's decision in Lochner v. New York 64 is attributed to
its real meaning: the development of industrialism and the untamed
urges within the truculent capitalist order, which could no longer be
denied.6"
The critics of conventional theory" imply that Justice Black distorted the real meaning of the first amendment. 7 Criticism, which focuses solely on distortions of the real meaning, overlooks a pertinent
distinction: "Believing is a mental activity which may be distinguished
. . .from that which is believed-sometimes called . . . the content of
the believing." 8 Justice Black probably believed that he was interpreting the framers' intent, however unreal his belief may appear to the
sophisticated historian of ideas. Surely Justice Black sometimes had
doubts, but it is not unconscionable when a judge keeps private his
doubts. Indeed, if a judge's understanding of the Constitution is

61.

(1971).
62.

Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47

IND.

L.J. 1, 4

For critiques of the practice of bringing forward the framers' intentions, see Munzer &

Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REY. 1029 (1977);
Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L. J. 907; Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579
(1978).
63. F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes. in Bobbs-Merrill Reprint
PS-86, at 216 (1947) (reprint of Justice Frankfurter's Address before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (Mar. 18, 1947)) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter, Reading of
Statutes].
64. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. See Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48 ETHicS 269, 293-94 (1938).
66. See J. ELY, supra note 2.
67. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 881 (1960) (Justice Black argues
that the framers did not intend to balance away first amendment rights).
68. M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM xvi-xVii

(1976).
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ascribed to the framers in the Court's opinion, he is following a traditional practice that has not been abandoned, except by a minute fraction of the population who write critically about the Court's reliance on
the framers' intent.
It is frequently useful to ascertain which principles were important
to the people who reached the compromises that resulted in the Constitution. When reliable historical materials are accessible, evidence that
the eighteenth century rival factions shared some fundamental principles that shed light on the meaning of the Constitution is always relevant to the Court. Maintaining the continuity of law in a dynamic society and being true to oneself are the arduous duties of a judge, whose
calling requires impartiality and fidelity to established law. The framers' intent is a source of law that helps a judge who is looking for the
steadying factors in the law. Professor Schauer wants to abandon the
practice of bringing forward the framers' intentions and writes, "[nJo
amount of looking into the minds of the framers . . .can render the
text less authoritative."69 This misses the point. Reynolds v. Sims 7 0
would have been a much easier case if the framers had provided evidence that they desired a "one person, one vote" formula. Schauer also
fails to stress that an existing precedent can be undermined when its
justification proves to be historically incorrect.
When counsel cites the framers' intent, the court reads the relevant evidence to test the representation. A corporation was held to be a
person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment in 188671
partly because counsel, four years earlier, had indulged in deliberate
deception. 72 On the other hand, suppose counsel had been telling the
truth about the framers' intent; is a court supposed to put the evidence
out of its mind? If not, reliance upon it is an appropriate justification
for the case ruling. The framers' intent perhaps is elusive,7 and even
an illusion in many cases, but the problems created by its relevancy will
not go away by wishing they would disappear.
Professor Perry argues that the framers' intent justification should
be used only when there is adequate historical evidence to support it.7 4
A distinction should be made (as a concession to this point of view)

69. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language. 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 809 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
70. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
71. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
72. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371
(1938).
73. In 1930 Max Radin wrote, "[tihat the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in
any real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition." Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
74. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 70.
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between finding the framers' intent and ascribing intent to the framers.
A theory of ultimate interpretivism would find the framers' intent on
the basis of evidence disclosing that influential participants in the debates over the original Constitution and its amendments intended specifically to constitutionalize a particular conception. The framers' intent justification would then be unquestionably legitimate when used as
direct evidence or used by way of analogy or metaphor. Suppose the
evidence discloses that the framers intended only to constitutionalize
broad concepts and aspirations. Under these circumstances, intent can
still occasionally be ascribed. It is extravagant to maintain that all ascriptions of the framers' intent are illegitimate when a court cites the
framers' first principles as opposed to the pragmatic eighteenth century
applications of their first principles.
Professor Perry finds "wholly lacking"7 5 the evidence of the framers' intent to constitutionalize broad concepts, but he overlooks
Madison's signal to posterity in the thirty-seventh essay of The Federalist.76 Madison wrote that "all new laws""7 are obscure until their
meaning is clarified, and that one method of ascertaining their meaning
is "a series of . . . adjudications." 7 Madison added, referring to the
failure of the framers to be more specific: "Experience has instructed
us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges
and powers of the different legislative branches."' He expected the different branches to check each other, 0 but he did not suggest limits,
which would prevent each branch from "liquidat[ing]"' 1 the meaning
of the Constitution's "equivocal"" provisions. He wrote that "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases [for the framers]
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas."' 8 He added that language was by its nature
"dim and doubtful"" and was susceptible to "vague and incorrect definitions"' 5 because of "indistinctness of the object," "imperfection of

75.

Id.

76.
77.

THE FEDERAUST No. 37, at 224-32 (J. Madison)(Mod. Libr. ad. 1937).

Id. at 229.

78. Id.
79.
80.
1937).

Id.
See THE FEDERAUST No. 51. at 335-41 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)(Mod. Libr. ed.

81. THE
82. Id.
83.

FEDERAuST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).

Id. at 230.

84. Id.
85. Id.
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the organ of conception," and "inadequateness of the vehicle of
ideas."" A judge with a hermeneutic perspective might or might not
draw the inference that Madison was authorizing all three branches of
government to particularize broad concepts as future experiences dictated. There is, however, ample evidence in The Federalistto provide a
rational basis for such an inference.
Madison doubtless was aware that once a particular principle is
discerned within a broad concept of the Constitution, the principle expands and contracts in unpredictable ways. He referred to "the common law" 87 of Great Britain as the exemplar.88 This is not to say that a
court has power to ignore the admittedly imperfect work of the Convention and covertly adopt an improved Constitution submitted by an
"ingenious theorist"8 9 who designs "a Constitution planned in his closet
or in his imagination."0 On this score, Alexander Hamilton agreed,
but wrote that over time the courts can particularize the meaning of
the Constitution's various provisions "and can adjust them to each
other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE." 9 1 The Scottish Enlightenment philosophy that was influential in the United States during
the late eighteenth century also stressed the difference between a concept and a conception and the need for those educated in the law to

clarify and particularize concepts. 9s I do not mean to intimate, however, that the judicial branch is authorized to use the Constitution as a

pretext for making policy; nor is any other branch of government so
authorized. 93 Extraconstitutional law, if not justified by accepted modes
of legal reasoning, is invalid."
Professor Perry claims that the judge who ascribes intent to the

framers lacks candor.'8 However, ascribing intent to authors of texts is

86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 229.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 231.

90. Id.
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 534 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). Hamilton also
wrote that "a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution
like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of
the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private
concerns." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 559 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). Hamilton was
writing to allay the fears that the government was empowered to nullify the reserved rights of the
people. Id.
92. See generally T. REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN (1971).
93. Hamilton wrote, "the courts must declare the serse of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body." THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 507-08 (A.
Hamilton)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
94. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
95. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 140.
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part of the art of judging. Judge Learned Hand wrote, "[n]obody does
this exactly right; great judges do it better than the rest of us." 96 Hand
was not suggesting, however, that the greater the judge, the less the
candor. Learned Hand himself was unable to perceive the words of the
Constitution as anything other than "empty vessels." As a result, he
deferred, perhaps excessively, to the electorally accountable officials.
This "hands of" pattern characterizes the Supreme Court's work product between 1937 and 1973, and it persists in many areas.
Deference is surely one legitimate option when the judge throws
up his arms in despair because he cannot find a principle grounded in
the Constitution except one that counsels deference. Deference to
electorally accountable officials is, however, but one underpinning of
the Constitution. There are others-namely, deference to the plain
meaning of the text, to precedent, to the rule of law, to the doctrine of
constitutionalism, to the reasonable expectations of the American people, and to the demonstrably perceptible yearnings of the framers. The
art of judging, however, cannot be explained by any theory of Constitutional law that completely ignores the art of ascribing intent to the
framers.
Any legitimate technique of interpretation that requires both personal detachment and creative imagination-can be abused; it is, however, clearly premature to abandon the practice of ascription. In constitutional law, as in other fields, complete "retooling is an extravagance
to be reserved for the occasion that demands it.' 7 The abuse of the
practice of ascribing intent to the framers has hardly reached the crisis
stage. It is still helpful; since "so very few ways of seeing will do...
the ones that have withstood the tests of group use are worth transmitting from generation to generation."I" This does not mean that the nature of the framers' intent paradigm must remain static. As a paradigm, "the balance between [its] inseparable legislative and definitional
force shifts over time."" Only after the nature of a change is appreciated "is normal puzzle-solving research possible."'"
The recent scholarly attack on the practice of ascribing intent to
the framers is so relentless that citation of the Constitution is in some
quarters already regarded as a mere "linguistic convention." 1 0 1 The
96. Proceedings of a Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to Commemorate Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service by The Honorable Learned
Hand 37 (Apr. 10, 1959).

97.

T.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIoNs

76 (2d ed. 1970).

98. Id. at 196.
99. Id. at 183.
100. Id. at 179.
101. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 143 n.*. Perry acknowledges and maintains that Dworkin
is mistaken in his belief that judges "make substantive decisions of political morality . . . in place
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irony is that Professor Perry construes the framers' intent restriction on
judicial discretion very strictly, yet he would have the courts engage in
what, on occasion, is illegitimate policymaking, a practice which he justifies by means of functional considerations. For example, much of
Perry's effective argument001 for judicial activism is "informed and
guided by a developing sensitivity to the moral and political plight of
society's 'marginal' persons." 108 His justification for judicial intervention is the prophetic competence of the courts, 1 " not its authorization
to identify established constitutional principles. Equating the courts'
perceived moral superiority with its legal power seems a more worrisome approach than the practice of relying plausibly on the framers'
intent. The worry is that the morally superior judge will be an intuitionist who desires to impose a set of authoritarian ethics on an unconsenting public. This elitism worried the framers.
Even some judges call the ascertainment of the framers' intent
pseudohistory. Judge Neely writes:
What the courts are really saying when they engage in this pseudohistory is that if the Founding Fathers had grown up in the twentieth century, had had all of our experiences, and perceived the problems from
our vantage point, they would decide the case the way the court writing
the opinion is deciding it. That is an interesting, but hardly reassuring,
approach to applying the mandates of a written constitutional
document.105
But if the cure for the infection of pseudohistory is a speculative, functional justification that does not depend on the written document at all,
except for cover, one might justly wish to retain the disease. Some ascriptions of the framers' intent are of course pseudohistory. When
Chief Justice Warren wrote the Court's Reynolds v. Sims'" opinion,
he cited Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address for authority.1 07 That
kind of embellishment is hardly reassuring. Dean Ely, on the other

hand, delivers a more powerful argument in defense of Warren Court

reapportionment decisions.10 8 It is not my intention to discuss whether
Reynolds v. Sims was a mistake of law, or whether Ely's approach is

of judgments made by the [framers)

. .

. rather [than) in service of those judgments." Id. at 113

n.s.

102. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 161-63.
103. Id. at 147.
104. Id. at 50-51. His primary justification is the ability of the courts to "function in part
by interacting, in a dialectic way, with other agencies of moral reevaluation and growth." Id. at
163. This is called, at times, its "prophetic function." Id. at 162.
105. R. NEELY, supra note 51, at 11.
106. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
107.
108.

Id. at 558.
For a discussion of reapportionment cases, see J. ELY, supra note 2, at 119-24.
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ultimately convincing. I do think, however, that Ely's approach points
us in the right direction toward a theory of ultimate interpretivism
which is more credible than pseudohistory.
It is unrealistic to expect Ely or some other ultimate interpretivist
to deliver a "knockdown" argument that dispels all doubts about the
framers' intent. In most, if not all cases, the historical materials do not
yield absolute inductive generalizations. Those who demand knockdown
arguments are demanding the impossible, which is a tactical device
that is useful for those who urge the courts to hasten our moral evolution. Any resemblance, for example, between legal principles, or constitutionalism, and the principles of morality cited by Professor Perry in
his argument for Supreme Court activism is purely coincidental."0 9 It is
this type of runaway noninterpretivism, which urges courts to rush pellmell to judgment, that stiffens the resolve of the conventional theorists
to fight back.
One astute commentator fighting back is Professor Monaghan,
who stresses the following points: 1 (1) "No convincing reason appears
why purpose may not be ascertained from any relevant source, including

. .

. 'legislative history.' "1"1 (2) Original intent "is . . .a way of

thinking about constitutional 'meaning' that follows from the basic concepts that legitimate judicial review itself." ' (3) Many of those opposed to the limitations of a framers' intent restriction view those restrictions as an impediment to their political goals. 1 ' (4) Many law
professors in the present generation have little interest in history. They
"are problem solvers by training. Their eyes are on the present, not the
past. By disposition, therefore, they are unsympathetic to being bound
by the chains of the past." ' ' (5) "Currently the most fashionable
formula is that the constitutional language is best understood simply as
an open-ended delegation to future interpreters to resolve problems in
accordance with the Framers' 'concepts,' but not their specific 'conceptions.' "I'D (6) The status of the Constitution's text as authoritatively

binding on all its interpreters is a first principle that cannot be validly
contested.11 6 (7) "It is, of course, a separate question whether such judicial activism is reconcilable with the premises of a political democ-

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 146-62.
See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution. 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
id. at 375.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 376-77.

114. Id. at 378.
115. Id. at 379 (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
Monaghan, however, does not join this fashion parade; the courts do.
116. Id. at 383.
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racy." 17 Professor Monaghan concludes by reiterating his well-argued
position that it is "wrong to believe that one can ascertain the meaning
of the constitution by asking: 'Is this what America stands for?' '"18
I am less rigid than Professor Monaghan. There does come a time
when one must concede that precedent is solidly entrenched. At some
point, a precedent like Reynolds v. Sims," which perhaps was mistakenly introduced into the law, becomes legitimate. For technical reasons,
it is valid until nullified, but its very existence over a period of time as
a valid norm gives it legitimacy. A case ruling is legitimate when it "is
rightful

. .

in the eyes of those subject to it.""10 At first, the public

might not actually consent to the precedent; there is, however, a halfconscious acquiescence, which is induced by the charisma of the Supreme Court of the United States. Over time the authority becomes not
only legitimate, but a tradition and a basis for new case rulings that
are generated by reasoned elaboration from seminal precedent. 12 A
line of principled case law development will likely take the Court beyond the framers' horizon of thought.
It is perhaps time to substitute Professor Dworkin's "concept of
constitutional intention"' for the practice of ascribing intent to the
framers, a practice which tends to widen the rift among normative
scholars of constitutional law. A theory of descriptive ultimate interpretivism, however, would retain the method of ascribing intent because it
is occasionally a convenient and plausible justification for a court's ruling, and the law's line of growth. Those who claim the framers' intent
is not binding have the burden to show, in each case, that the original
understanding is absurdly anachronistic.
VI.

PROFESSOR PERRY'S THEORY: A CRITIQUE

A judge has the duty of justifying "the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions,"' "28 and of" 'ensuring
the unbroken continuance of law and preserving the tradition of the
legal idea.' ""2 The judge relies on relevant history, enduring traditions, precedent, existential principles of law, the framers' intent, and
other materials that look backwards in time. Professor Michael Perry's
117. Id. at 396 n.241.
118. Id. at 396.
119. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This is a rhetorical point. America often will see that the Constitution affirms what it stands for.
120. C. FRIEDRICH, TRADITION AND AUTHORITY 49 (1972).
121. Id.at 57.
122. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 469.
123. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
124. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 292 (1975).
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new theory of extraconstitutional policymaking12 5 looks forward, and
Perry challenges the idea that a crucial theoretical question of constitutional law "is not whether the intention of those who made the Constitution should count, but rather what should count as that intention.' 1 2
It would seem that a judge is empowered, under certain circumstances,
to deviate from the framers' particular concrete intentions. 2 Professor
Perry claims, however, there is no evidence that the framers authorized
the judge to write his own conceptions of individual rights into the
Constitution. 2 8 Perry overstates his case.
Contrary to Perry's position, there is circumstantial evidence that
the framers authorized interpreters of the Constitution to make value
judgments that are not necessarily analogous to the framers' own particular value judgments.' 2 ' For example, the framers were familiar
with the maxim, "[w]hosoever has an absolute authority to interpret
any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all
' 30
intents and purposes and not the person who spoke or wrote them."'
The framers, in other words, contemplated the concept-conception distinction, which, as Perry points out, is "a variation on the old interpretation-application theme."''
More significantly, the framers knew that the "Magna Carta lay
dormant for four hundred years until it was revived in the early seventeenth century to serve as the foundation of a natural law edifice which
would support English subjects' demands for greater participation in
government and for improved guarantees of their civil and economic
rights."' " Thus, they knew that "those seeking dramatic change in the
order of society were able to allege that [the Magna Carta] has always
been the law.' 3 3 It is rational to assume that the Founding Fathers
contemplated that their posterity would also employ the same venerable
technique of adding gloss to an authoritative document beyond that
which was contemplated by its authors.

125. M. PERRY, supra note 18.
126. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 499-500.
127. Id. at 488-91.
128. See M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 70.
129. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
130. The quote is apparently taken from Bishop Hoadley's Sermon preached before the
King in 1717. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES I (5th ed. 1981). The quote is similar to Richard Spaight's sentiments, as expressed in
a letter to James Iredell: "if the judiciary acted as a check on the legislature, then who was to act
as a check upon the judiciary?" See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 8 (1971). Spaight thought that the only way to control the judiciary
was "through the annual election of judges." Id.
131. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 71.
132. R. NEELY, supra note 51, at 19.
133. Id.
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The Founding Fathers were apprehensive but realistic about indeterminate provisions, "for whenever we leave Principles and clear and
positive Laws," John Adams observed, "and wander after Constructions, one Construction or Consequence is piled upon another until we
get an immense distance from Fact, Truth and Nature.' 3 4 Eighteenth
century Americans were quite familiar with the English common law
which kept pace with custom including "the reforming work of Lord
Mansfield in England, which convinced many Americans that judges
could not be depended on merely to apply existing law."'' 33
The influential common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid,' although neglected by contemporary American legal historians, distinguished between a general concept and a particular conception. According to Reid, a popular conception of a word's meaning is the
shared meaning of the word, and the interpretation of a general' concept of law depends on the conceptions of interpreters who understand
the law.13 7 Reid's writing was well-known in eighteenth century North
America, and his works made it clear that words and concepts are unlike Platonic forms; he and his readers were quite aware that the meanings of words change over time, as shared conceptions of meanings
change.
The evidence also supports a plausible argument that the framers
were sophisticated enough to understand that an interpreter of the law
has discretion to expound the particular meaning of the general principles in the Constitution. Carl Friedrich wrote that in the eighteenth
century "[nlorms generally seemed to these times and their representative thinkers to be the more important and valuable, the more general
they were." ' The general norms were the principles, the content that
was left to posterity was simply policy.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment also adopted broad language, knowing full well that the Court's previous interpretations of the
Constitution's broad provisions were often creative. The concept "privileges and immunities" ' 9 is so broad that Judge Bushrod Washington

134. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 5 (1977).
135. Id. at 18. While it appears that a great danger was perceived to be the judicial construction of statutes (even as the judges claimed that they were not making law) my effort is to
show that the interpreter of the Constitution, in whatever branch, has leeway, and that this possibility was apprehended by the framers.
136. For a discussion of Thomas Reid's influence on James Madison, see G. WILLS, ExPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST

15-17 (1981).

137. See generally T. REID, supra note 92.
138. C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 217 (2d ed.
1963).
139. John Ely, after noting that the Court has not backed away from its narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's "privileges and immunities" clause in the Slaughter-House
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in Corfield v. Coryell'" was unable to enumerate all the rights that are
comprehended by article IV, section 2. The concept is also dynamic
since the evolving common law drops and adds privileges and immunities as it keeps pace with custom.
Although the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment has its roots in article IV, section 2,1 1 it was intended specifically to constitutionalize the few rights that were identified in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866." a The phrase "privileges and immunities"
was chosen for several reasons. First, Congress wanted to reserve power
to enact legislation that was necessary and proper to secure adequate
racial equality. 48 The words were also chosen to encourage a latitudinarian construction of the fourteenth amendment by the courts that
would decide whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was constitutional.
Moreover, the generality of the language1 44 was designed to attract
support from all-radicals, moderates, and conservatives-who subscribed to the abstract ideal of equal civil rights, 145 even if many persons had doubts or disagreements as to precisely how the broad language would be interpreted once it was added to the Constitution."
When the fourteenth amendment was debated, a full measure of
equal rights for the emancipated slaves was not contemplated for the
short run. The freedmen were not yet economically self-reliant; as a
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). writes: "The reason has to be that the invitation extended by
the language of the clause is frightening .. " J. ELY, supra note 2,at 23 (footnote omitted).
140. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
141. R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 138. See id. at 22, 29, 38-45.
142. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1866 nor
the fourteenth amendment conferred or guaranteed political rights. See R. BERGER, supra note
16, at 30.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 221-29.
144. George Boutwell, a member of the Joint Committee that drafted the fourteenth
amendment, recalled that the phrase "privileges and immunities" came from Representative John
A. Bingham. 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES pt. i, at
1270 (1971). Representative Kelley, a radical, supported the fourteenth amendment, and stated
that it would "'more explicitly empower Congress to enforce and maintain' the rights of the
people." Id. at 1277.
145. Frederick E. Woodbridge, a member of the Judiciary Committee, stated that the object of the amendment was to "enable Congress to give to all citizens the inalienable rights of life
and liberty.. " Id. at 1279. Most radicals construed the term "privileges and immunities" in a
far-reaching way. Id. at 1287-96. Revardy Johnson, a leading constitutional lawyer, who took a
moderate pro-Southern line most of the time, complained that he did not "understand what will
be the effect of [the privileges and immunities clause]." Id. at 1297. Fairman notes, "[coming
from him, that amounted to a certificate that, for purposes of litigation, the privileges and immunities clause did not have a definite meaning." Id.
146. The moderates in Congress who were trying to achieve a consensus were walking a
tightrope. W. R. Brock writes: "Caught between the dogmatism of [President Andrew] Johnson
and the extremism of [Thaddeusi Stevens they tried to reach a solution which would satisfy everyone . . . and the result was an impossible situation." W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION

1865-1867, at 151 (1966).
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group, they were not yet perceived to be fully prepared for freedom and
as a result, when the fourteenth amendment was ratified, blacks in
some respects were simultaneously regarded as citizens and wards of
the government. 14 7 The urgent problem during the early phase of reconstruction was the coercive state codes that prevented emancipated
blacks from enjoying several civil rights of free persons.1' 8 The school
segregation problem was not a high priority on the agenda of the Congress. There was virtually no public education provided for the Negro
in the South.1 4 9 Moreover state-mandated, systematic segregation in
public places in the South was less of a problem in the late 1860's than
it was in the late 1890's and early 1900's.bo
Congress in 1867 actually had nothing that resembled a comprehensive plan for racial equality; it is not surprising, therefore, that the
dominant coalition that was in charge of reconstruction kept open
many options. The federal government had adequate military and police powers to protect its most immediately pressing interests,151 but no
one was sure what other particular measures would be appropriate to
secure racial equality after the full restoration of all the states to their
rights in the Union. In short, most of the nation adopted a "wait and
1 52
see" attitude.
Congress feared that the Court might be sympathetic towards the
states' rights point of view."' On the other hand, a few Supreme Court
decisions had generously construed the Constitution in favor of human
rights, and this sporadic judicial activism added gloss to the Constitution.1 54 Thus, Congress in 1867 was aware that the framers' specific
147. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) ("special favorite of the laws"). Frank
Tannenbaum wrote: "One must always remember that the Negro started after the Civil War with
nothing at all; he had neither education, nor property, nor position, nor the psychological readiness
for achievement and personal growth. F. TANNENBAUM, SLAvE AND CITIZEN 113 (1946). The free
Negroes in the United States before emancipation were relatively few in number and too weak in
influence to provide adequate leadership for the vast numbers of new freedmen. Id. at 104. Regarded as a chattel for many years, the emancipated blacks were thrust into a new and undefined
status, a halfway level between slave and equal-a freedman. Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 12, 1865
(report of a speech by Henry Ward Beecher).
148. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 144, pt. I at 1 10-11.
149. Id. at 115, 330-33. During the period of reconstruction, some steps were taken to provide a system of public schools in the South, open to all, without distinction of race or color. Id. at
330.
150. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 67-102 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
151.

See generally C. FAIRMAN, supra note 144, at pt. I.

152. Id. at 315.
153. Charles Fairman noted that Justice Nelson, in the case of In re Egan. wrote that the
moment a rebel state's government became reorganized, "the ancient laws resumed their accustomed sway" since the state is "entitled to the full enjoyment, of her constitutional rights and
privileges." Id. at 148. This "Portentous dictum" was announced in 1866. Id.
154. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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intentions, in cases involving the Constitution, are not always realized,
particularly when they are unclear. The loose language of the fourteenth amendment, which was proposed by Congress was a standing

invitation for innovative interpretation by courts.
The burning question was the scope of the fourteenth amend-

ment's protection for blacks. As Charles Fairman writes, "[a] form of

words had been made supreme law." 55 The developments that eventually determined the content of the fourteenth amendment's "form of
words" can be briefly summarized. Several of the common law's substantive privileges and immunities became rights that were protected
by the Court's conception of substantive due process. 56 Although the
Court strictly construed Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement

powers,"5 " in several cases15 8 the Court took the position that what is
implied in the Constitution "is as much a part of the instrument as
what is expressed."' 5" Justice Bradley pointed out that the language of
the fourteenth amendment was "general, embracing all citizens, and

.. .[that] it was purposely so expressed." '16 0 Thus, there was a built-in
need for courts to discern the underlying aspirations of the amend-

ment's supporters.
Justice Bradley's generous interpretation of the fourteenth amendment was consistent with a shift in the balance of power between the
federal government and the states, which was desired by most of the
framers. In Justice Bradley's view, the judiciary is empowered to define
the scope of the fourteenth amendment, and he wrote:

155. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 144, pt. 1, at 1300.
156. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 167-90.
157. See, e.g.. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (the Court drastically curtailed the privileges and immunities recognized as being under Congress' protection).
158. See. e.g.. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875).
159. Ex parte Yarbrough, I10 U.S. 651, 658 (1884). Other decisions which disclose judicial
creativity in the late nineteenth century before the era of substantive due process include the
following: Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Logan v. United States. 144 U.S. 263
(1892); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
160. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 123 (1873) (Bradley, J.,dissenting).
Justice Bradley also wrote:
It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the far
reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but one particular phase of
social and political wrong which they desired to redress. Yet, if the amendment, as framed
and expressed, does in fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield
over those who were never thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does
reach social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to
be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they
were doing, and meant to decree what has in fact been decreed.
Live Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House
Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870)(No. 8408).
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[T]he Amendment was an attempt to give voice to the strong National
yearning for that ...

condition of things, in which ...

every citizen of

the United States might stand erect on every portion of its soil, in the
full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to a
freeman. ....
.61

Charles Fairman suggests that Justice Bradley's understanding of the
"national yearning" was in accord with what members of Congress,
hazily and hopefully, had seemed to be saying when they supported the
amendment. 16 2 This kind of ultimate interpretivism is not a novel twentieth century doctrine. In the Dartmouth College case, 163 Chief Justice
Marshall explained that the underlying reason of a constitutional 1provision governs situations unanticipated when the text was framed. 4
By 1954, interests that were labeled social rights as late as 1883165
were labeled civil rights--even by racists who fought desegregation. It
became obvious during the twentieth century that blacks had become,
once again, victimized by a system that prevented them from enjoying
the civil rights of emancipated free persons. In the Slaughter-House
cases, 166 the Court had warned states to protect blacks from racially
motivated "bad men" who would deprive them of the rights of emancipated men. 16 ' The oblique warning went unheeded, and it was not until
the 1950's that the accumulated case precedent clearly justified the
wholesale8 invalidation of state-mandated segregation laws by judicial
16
decree.
Was Brown v. Board of Education1 " an incremental step in a long

line of growth, or was the decision, as Perry suggests, an example of
unauthorized extraconstitutional policymaking by the Court? Although
Professor Perry points out that "segregated golf courses are not simply
an analogue" 17° of a practice specifically banned by the framers, segregation was actually a greater evil than many of the practices that were
specifically banned by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The combative,
comprehensive, ruthlessly destructive, rigid system of segregation which
prevented blacks from mingling with whites at golf courses, picture
houses, auditoriums, bus terminals, ball parks, lunch counters,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
opment of
169.
170.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 123.
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 144, pt. 1, at 1363.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Id. at 644. See also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 144, pt. I, at 1301.
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 69-70.
See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976) (elaborate description of the develthe relevant precedent in school segregation cases).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 72.
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washrooms, schools, parks, neighborhoods, homes for the deaf, and penal institutions operated to push blacks farther down the ladder which
led to equality and progress."' One insulting ordinance required a circus and tent show to have separate entrances, exits, ticket windows,
and ticket sellers kept at least twenty-five feet apart. 72 Is it really crucial whether the framers banned this particular manifestation of an obscene system?
It was the system of segregation that prevented blacks from enjoying their civil rights and liberties. Given the longstanding aspirations
in favor of equal civil rights for blacks, did it any longer make sense to
condone systematic racial segregation in public facilities? After a long
process of tentative gropings, the Court acted forcefully in the 1950's.
If Brown is "extraconstitutional," then MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co." 8 is extralegal. Both cases were the culminations of lines of growth
in case law,1 7 ' and were incremental by-products of an acceptable and
traditional common law theory of adjudication. " '
In.Brown, the Court took account of the lack of any original specific understanding about school segregation, but it also understood
that historical changes had occurred since the fourteenth amendment
was ratified. Although the Court defined afresh the normative scope of
the equal protection clause, Brown was not a radical break with accumulating precedent. In legal hermeneutics, "[tihe judge who adapts
the transmitted [constitutional] law to the needs of the present is undoubtedly seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation of
the law is by no means on that account an arbitrary re-interpretation."'' 6 Not only are the antecedents of a constitutional provision legally significant; its line of growth is taken into account by the interpreter. The valid meaning of a constitutional provision is correctly
7
understood "by seeing the past in its continuity with the present."'
Reliable descriptive theories of law recognize the force of case precedent. "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts," Alexander
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist,"it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them. .... ,.7 The framers intended the courts to follow precedent.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
American
176.
177.
178.

C. WOODWARD, supra note 150, at 97-102, 108.
id. at 99-100.
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-19 (1948).
See generally R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (1961) (discussion of Anglodoctrine of precedent).
H. GADAMER, supra note 124, at 292.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510-11 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
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They knew 179 that "precedent gives to the legal system that rigidity
which it must have if it is to possess a definite body of principles, and
the flexibility which it must have if it is to adapt itself to the needs of a
changing society."' 80 Hamilton envisioned a system of judicial review
that required the Court to adopt a theory of adjudication that was
modeled on a doctrine of precedent in force in the courts of Great Britain. Therefore, a novel case ruling that is consistent with a binding
precedent is valid and in conformity with the Constitution. In sum,
Brown, which is based on precedent and consistent with the underlying
values of the fourteenth amendment, is not an example of illegitimate
noninterpretivism. Perry, however, believes that Brown is extraconstitutional, unauthorized, and yet still justifiable because of the Court's
comparative competence to discover "right answers-to fundamental
political-moral problems."' 8 '
The unusual facet of Perry's thesis is his belief that the Court can
make policy that is based on extraconstitutional points of law. Perry
anticipated correctly that his critics would argue that such extraconstitutional policymaking is a contraconstitutional practice.' 8" In my view,
absent a justifying valid principle that is generated by the basic values
of society, which are inchoate in the Constitution's text, structure, and
history, including its presuppositions and elaborations in precedent, a
case ruling that is extraconstitutional is a contraconstitutional exercise
of judicial power.
I run the risk of belaboring an obvious point, but a legal norm that
is a legally valid norm is a part of a system of legally valid norms. A
norm that is logically incompatible with any norm, which has superior
validity, is not a valid norm. The basic norm, which always has superior validity, is the Constitution, which "is in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law." '' 83 It is repugnant to
traditional canons of legal reasoning and constitutionalism when a
court, exercising the power of judicial review, uses the pretext of extraconstitutionality to "substitute their own pleasure to the constitu84
tional intentions."'1
Validity is an epistemological, organizing concept that is devoid of
substantive political content,18 5 but it provides the basis for the logical
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
R. CRoss, supra note 175, at 251.
M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 102.
Id. at ix.

183.
184.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78. at 506 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
Id. at 507. See also supra notes 4 & 5.

185. Hans Kelsen writes:
Legal norms are not valid because they themselves. . . have a content the binding force of
which is self-evident. They are not valid because of their inherent appeal. Legal norms may
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possibility of a legal system that has intelligible form and structure.
Indeed, validity is the technical attribute that gives a norm its obligatory character, and it is the obligatory character of a norm which distinguishes extraconstitutional norms from the authorized norms that
qualify as law in the legal order. 1 6 Perry's theory ignores the concept
of validity and is, for that reason, a political theory in search of validation. Absent validation, his argument lacks the quality of a legal
theory.
Professor Perry claims that Americans, if they "fully understood
the issues

. . .

would

. . .

accept

. . .

noninterpretive review in human

rights cases." 18 7 It is sheer speculation, however, for Perry to suggest
that the public would accept unauthorized extraconstitutional policymaking by a court simply because Congress allows the court to grab
power. Perry concedes that some of his theoretically important assumptions are "not susceptible to empirical demonstration."' " More specifically, Perry concedes that he cannot demonstrate that his alleged
"functional justification" 18 ' for extraconstitutional policymaking by
courts will "enable us to keep a rough faith" 1 "0with our dualistic commitment to (1) "ongoing moral reevaluation and moral growth"191 and
(2) "the principle of electorally accountable policymaking."192 He nevertheless claims that extraconstitutional judicial policymaking is justified by the significant control Congress possesses over federal court jurisdiction (which, he supposes, will contribute to an ongoing national
moral dialogue).
There are several objections to Professor Perry's approach which
encourages Congress to second guess the Court's decisions that are not
modern analogues to specific practices that were banned by the framers. First, sponsors of court-stripping bills can exploit Perry's idea for
purposes that will not necessarily enrich the ongoing moral dialogue. A
have any kind of content. There is no kind of human behavior [from the standpoint of legal
science] that, because of its nature, could not be made into a legal duty corresponding to a
legal right. The validity of a legal norm cannot be questioned on the ground that its contents are incompatible with some moral or political value.
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 113 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961).
186. Roscoe E. Hill makes a distinction between being legally obliged and a legal obligation. He admits "that it is possible to give an adequate, clear, hardheaded, account of legal valid" Hill, Legal Validity and
ity, free of any appeal to the principles of justice and morality ..
Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47, 75 (1970). He, however, is of the view "that an adequate
analysis of legal obligation must appeal to the principles of justice and morality." Id.
187. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 141.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

139.
138.
139.
138.
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concept of moral growth that is virtually all penumbra and little core is
vulnerable to perverse and unpredictable application by interpreters of
the Constitution who claim that decisions like Brown v. Board of Education are extraconstitutional.
Second, when the courts are free to exercise their virtually unfettered discretion, a sophisticated litigant will ask whether there is a
valid reason that requires him to obey a case ruling. Clearly, individuals who are not litigants in the case will be less likely to obey the
court's decree voluntarily. Third, the executive branch can honestly
take the position that it is not authorized to enforce extraconstitutional
norms. The executive branch is not the puppet of the courts. The exercise of the executive power is authorized only by valid norms. 93 Perry,
by seeking to close the countermajoritarian loophole in constitutional
theory, opens Pandora's box. There is no reason, which is based on the
Constitution, that suggests why the executive branch ought to obey an
extraconstitutional decision. In fact, ordinarily it should not obey an
admittedly unauthorized judicial decision.
Fourth, Perry's theory authorizes the Supreme Court to act as an
administrative agency with rulemaking powers. The public, however,
does not have any procedural. protections (for example, notice and an
opportunity for comment)"' when the Court, qua Supreme Administrative Agency, makes rules. Moreover, when an authorized government agency makes rules, the legislature retains the power to reverse
the rulemaking agency; when the difference between a court and an
agency is hard to perceive, Perry's own ambivalence about the power of

193. Kelsen tries to capture the dynamic quality of authorizing norms in the following
passage:
The judge authorized by a statute (that is, a general norm) to decide concrete cases,
applies the statute to a concrete case by a decision which constitutes an individual norm.
Again, authorized by a judicial decision to execute a certain punishment, the enforcement
officer "applies" the individual norm of a judicial decision.
H. KELSEN, supra note 4, at 16. See id. at 39-45.
194. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides in part:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless
persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual
notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include(I) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) (emphasis added). The Act further provides: "After notice . . . the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c). Any interested person means any person who is interested in the rule. There
are no standing to sue requirements.
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Congress to reverse the Court's case rulings' 1 ' will not stand in the way
of a determined Congress.
In the legal system of the United States, many political actors and
scholars tolerate the Court's activism particularly when the general
public is not aware that a serious mistake of law has been made or
when the decision is perceived by the public as a legitimate decision
which is consistent with society's reasonable expectations. But few specialists in constitutional law condone or encourage mistakes of law by
courts. Professor Perry's approach condones and, in some cases, encourages mistakes of constitutional law. Is not that its greatest danger? The
stakes are indeed high when the Court is encouraged to make mistakes
of law -

deliberately.

Perry's theory encourages a judge to select any "particularpolitical-moral criteria that are, in [his] view, authoritative."1' 9 The judge is
also free to select the less fragmented "developing insights of moral
philosophy and theology."' ' " There is no stipulation in Perry's theory
that the extraconstitutional principles selected by the judge have to be
established or inchoate in the law. There is no requirement that the
particular criterion selected must explain and justify previously decided
case rulings in addition to the case at bar. There is no admonition
cases alike. Perry, who admonishes the judge to be
about deciding like
"candidly clear" 19 ' about his court's development of constitutional doctrine, writes that "[s]urely there is no harm in maintaining the linguistic convention of saying the action violates the Constitution.""' This
approach, which gives the judge unusual discretion to decide cases (intuitively) based solely upon his own preferences, is clearly at odds with
contemporary and traditional expositions ofthe rule of law concept depending, of course, on the judge's values, and on how often he
changes his mind.
John Rawls refers to the rule of law as "justice as regularity."'20
He writes, "[i]f deviations from justice as regularity are too pervasive,
a serious question may arise whether a system of law exists as opposed
to a collection of particular orders designed to advance the interests of
a dictator or the ideal of a benevolent despot."' 0 ' Inspired by Professor
Perry's theory, a judge could change his particular political-moral cri195. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 112.
196. Id. at III (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 118.
198. Id. at 143 n..
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971). Rawls maintains that the rule of law is
compatible with injustice. Id. at 236. The wide realm of judicial discretion provided by Perry's
theory is likewise compatible with injustice.
201. Id. at 236.
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teria as often as he develops new insights. His new insights, however
benevolently intended, "would not [belong to] a legal system since they
would not serve to organize social behavior by providing a basis for
legitimate expectations." ' 2 Perry, however, rejects the framers' intent
and tradition as not "much help"205 to the judge, and Perry apparently
would often sacrifice stability in the law for progress.
A judge that develops a coherent, consistent system of norms serving as a "principled ground"0s4 for his human rights doctrine, can overcome the problems that destabilize the legal system. But suppose the
insight of moral progress that he adopts is incompatible with the values
of the Constitution. The judge, according to Perry, may nonetheless
attribute his case rulings to the Constitution - without a credible discussion that discloses why it is attributable. 0 5 Contrary to Perry, the
Supreme Court of the United States is expected to justify its case rulings on the basis of principles that appear genuinely attributable to the
Constitution. The public demands this safeguard because "[t]here is, to
many men, something frightening and uncontrollable about an individual who insists upon taking his own reasoned judgment as the final
authority for his actions."''
Perry, as noted, seeks to overcome these familiar objections to the
activism of an electorally unaccountable Supreme Court by a functional justification for judicial review. His justification, which contemplates congressional supervision of illegitimate judicial policymaking,
however, is weak because "the burden of legislative inertia" 07 prevents
Congress "from serving as a source of significant political control over
noninterpretive review"'2'0 and "serves to enhance"2 09 the Court's political power. When Madison devised the Constitution's system of representation, he counted on the ambition of officials to check the power of
other officials;210 he did not count on the kind of inertia that Perry
seems to have in mind.
The politically ambitious members of Congress who presently
want to strip the Court of jurisdiction are catering, sometimes excessively, to single issue groups, the very kind of factions who, in
Madison's day were interfering with the government's ability to pro-

204.
205.

Id. at 238.
M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 93.
Id. at 105.
See id. at 140.

206.

R.

207.

M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 134.

208.

Id.

209.
210.

Id. at 135.

202.

203.

WOLFF, THE RULE OF LAW

8 (1971).

THE FEDERAuST No. 51, at 337 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)(Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
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mote an acceptable conception of the general welfare. 11 Professor
Perry claims, however, an educational nationwide dialogue will be beneficial, because "[tjhe moral sensibilities of the pluralistic American
polity typically lag behind, and are more fragmented than the developing insights ' 21 2 of prophetic moralists. Perry's functional justification is
not, strictly speaking, a legal justification, and it has the weaknesses of
any functional approach that utilizes obscure concepts (more indeterminate than many he rejects on grounds of indeterminacy) that are not
grounded on testable empirical data. The judge is also likely to depart
from the developing insights of morality, and has no valid basis to select one developing insight over another when he is left at large.
Perry notes that a very great jurist, Justice Cardozo, knew when
one competing interest outweighed another by consulting sources external to the law: "from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from
life itself. ' 213 Justice Cardozo, however, did not have a theory of law
that empowered judges to ignore clearly applicable legal principles. He
did believe that judges had discretion to fill in the gaps - the unanswered questions - in the Constitution. Rights, not specifically mentioned in the written Constitution, can be incorporated on the basis of
the traditional, reasonable expectations of individuals in a self-governing republic. These rights, peripheral to the Constitution, are not
authorized by any philosopher's developing moral insights, but from
trustworthy evidence that indicates whether particular liberties are sufficiently cherished, widely shared, and enduring enough to have special
constitutional significance. Justice Cardozo was careful to justify his
own judgments upon the values "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 2 14 This is legitimate noninterpretivism.
Justice Cardozo did not impose a system of authoritarian ethics
upon an unconsenting republic. Such a despotic exercise of power was
contrary to his understanding of the Supreme Court's role. Thus, when
Professor Perry cites, with approval, the judge's own values as the authoritative source and justification of the law, he abstracts a part of
constitutional interpretation from the whole. The part should be recognized as such and not mistaken for the whole.
211.

The point in the text concerning Madison is not free from doubt but I agree with Ely

that Madison's theory, derived from David Hume and spelled out at length in The Federalist, was
that although at a local level one "faction" might well have sufficient clout to be able to tyrannize
others; in the national government, no faction or interest group would constitute a majority capable of exercising control. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 80.
212. M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 118.
213. Id. at III (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113
(1921)).
214. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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VII.

A

FINAL CAVEAT

A descriptive theory of constitutional law admits that the judge
may impose his own values if there are gaps in the law when the imposed values are compatible with the reasonable expectations of society
and the first principles of the Constitution. A judge, however, may not
impose his elitist values solely because they are consistent with developing insights of social justice. There is a story about Georgi Plekhanov,
perhaps apocryphal, that discloses the frightening potential of entrusting well-intentioned persons with power to re-educate the masses.
In 1903, at a conference of the Russian Social Democratic Party,
there was a discussion concerning the envisaged benevolent social
transformation and about party discipline. A comrade asked whether
the absolute authority that was exercised by the Party's revolutionary
nucleus was incompatible with the basic liberties that protected the inviolability of the person. Plekhanov, a venerated scholar and a warm,
humane, and morally sensitive leader, informed the Party that "if the
revolution demanded it, everything - democracy, liberty, the rights of
the individual - must be sacrificed to it." 2 1 ' The so-called benevolent
social transformation, in other words, "could not be carried through by
men obsessed by scrupulous regard for the principles of bourgeois
liberals." 1
Plekhanov's deviation from first principles is not, needless to say, a
practical model for a judge. He absolutely may not- it is simply impossible to avoid evoking the Platonic Guardian image at this pointseek to save the people from their own reasonable expectations because
they hold "morally incorrect" values. He may not intrusively interrupt
the ongoing democratic dialogue, however morally flawed, by fiat or by
employing the justification that he knows what the people really want.
Moreover, the Court is not an impartial arbiter when it adopts the position of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov:
[H]e said that what men dreaded most was freedom of choice, to be left
alone to groupe their way in the dark; and the Church by lifting the
responsibility from their shoulders made them willing, grateful, and
happy slaves. The Grand Inquisitor stood for the dogmatic organization
of the life of the spirit: Bazerov for its theoretical opposite -free scientific inquiry, the facing of the 'hard' facts, the acceptance of the truth
however [socially unjust].'"'
There are some normative constitutional scholars who are more subtle

215.
216.
217.

i. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 17 (1970).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 33-34.
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than Plekhanov, or the Grand Inquisitor. Michael Perry, for example,
writes that noninterpretive judicial review functions to enable us as a
people "to see beyond, and then to live beyond, the imperfections of
whatever happens at the moment to be the established moral
conventions." 1 8
The Court would not impose right answers; it would generate a
dialogue that leads to moral progress toward right answers. Perry's
Court generates the moral dialogue perhaps before the time is ripe for
an enlightening dialogue. Yet, the Court is said to be an institution
that looks "ahead to emergent principles in terms of which fragments
of a new moral order can be forged."' " Perry points out that the current political morality on certain issues within the competence of courts
is "a stagnant or even regressive morality."22 0 In short, the moral sensibilities of the pluralistic American polity "typically lag behind" those
who have better insights.22
It is one thing for a theorist to point out the moral flaws in the
American people; it is quite another when he presumes that they would
consent to a prophetic role for the Court. The judge is expected to be
an intermediary between the people and their representatives; the Supreme Court is not an institution in charge of their spiritual
development.
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